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NOTES.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST AcT-LABiLITY
OF A LABOR UNION FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM ACTS IN

TRADE-What will be two epochal decisions in the
struggle between capital and labor if finally affirmed by the Supreme
Court have been handed down in the Bache-Denman Coal Company
Case.' Upon demurrer the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, held that though unincorporated the United Mine Workers of
America was suable under the Sherman Act for treble damages
as an "association existing under or authorized by the laws of the
RESTRAINT OF
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United States or of the states." 2 At the trial the District Court
held that under its constitution the international union was liable
for the acts of the local and district unions.3
The Bache-Denman Coal Company operated large tracts of
coal land in Arkansas. Prior to April, 1914, it had been operating
them on a union shop basis. Finding that the restrictions imposed
by the union rules were malcing serious inroads on its possible
profits the company in April, 1914, started on an open shop basis.
On April 6, 1914, a riot occurred, and the union men beat up
several of the company's non-union men, forced the rest to abandon
the property, and placed their flag on the top of the tipples. By
July, i914, in spite of continual picketing and intimidation by the
t nion men, the Coal Company had collected a sufficient force to
pump the mines free of water and get ready to resume operations.
On July 17, 1914, the union men, anticipating the example of the

"civilized" nations and the advice of the "Christian" church that
the best and only way to get what you think to be justice is by
force and arms, commenced a day of frightfulness which would
do credit to the most "kultured" nations. They attacked the mines in
force, dynamited and burned the shafts and tipples, drove off the
employees, killing or wounding several of them, and left the premises
a total ruin.
A receiver was shortly appointed, by whom suit for treble
damages was brought in the District Court against the international
union, district union No. 21, within the district of which the mines
are located, the local unions involved, various officers of the unions,
and a number of individuals who were known to have participated.
The acts were alleged to have been done in pursuance of the
avowed policy of the union to keep non-union mined coal from
competing with union mined c6al as much as possible by unionizing
non-union mines and preventing union mines from being non-unionized. Demurrers were filed on the grounds, among others, that the
complaint did not state a violation of the Sherman Act, and that the
international union and the local unions, being unincorporated, could
not be sued in their own names. These demurrers were sustained
specifically on the first ground, the other grounds being overruled.
Upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the sufficiency
of the allegations was sustained on the 4authority of a long line
of cases culminating in Lawlor v. Loewe. This does not concern
us in this article.
Taking up the other ground of demurrer, that the United Mine
Workers of America and the different local unions were unincorporated and could not be sued in their own names, the court held
See note i,supra.
Not yet reported.
'235 U. S. 522 (,915).
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that it also was without merit. it is true, say the court, that at
common law an unincorporated association can not be sued in its
own name. But this may be changed by statute; and not only by
express enactment but by statutory implication. Section 7 of the
Sherman Act 5 provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by any other person or corporation by reason
of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may
sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or may be found, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Section 8 of the same actI provides: "The word 'person'
or 'persons,' whenever used in this act, shall be deemed to include
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the territories,
the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country."
The question then is whether "associations existing under or
authorized by" means only those organized under a particular act.
If so all labor unions generally would be relieved of all liability. It
was clearly not the intention of Congress, continue the court, to
relieve anyone from liability for injuries caused by violations of
this act. These unions comprise about 4ooooo -members, and are
capable of great good or harm. They are existing under or
authorized by law. They do not claim that they are unlawful associations. They must therefore be liable for injuries done by them
or their agents. Being so liable they must be suable in their own
names. Otherwise this liability could not be enforced and the
law would be of no avail as to them. The law must therefore be
intended to include them and they may be sued in their own names.
This case goes one step further than any previous case in
America. The Danbury Hatters' Case 7 was a suit against the
individual members of the union. In the cases of the Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. U. S., 8 and U. S. v.
Workingmen's Council,9 both of which were bills in equity for an
injunction, no objection was raised that the suit was against the
0
association in its own name. In Franklin Union No. 4 v. People,2
a bill in equity, no objection was made until on appeal which was
held to be too late.
'Act July 2, 789o, c. 647 (26 Stat. 210).
.
*See note 5,supra.
'Lawlor v. Loewe, see note 4, supra.
' 234 U. S. 60 (1914).
'54 Fed. 994 (I893).
10220 IlL 355 (19o6).

270

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

In equity under rule 38 of the Federal Courts the members of
a large unincorporated association may be proceeded against by
bringing into court its officers and such other members as may
be conveniently summoned as representatives of the whole number.11
Injunctions binding upon all the members of a labor union have
been issued though only the officers and a few of the members had
actually been summoned as parties to the case.12 But there has
never been an analogous rule on the law side. It has always been
necessary to bring into court all whom it was desired to bind by a
judgment. Unincorporated associations have not been suable by
name in the absence of statutory enactment. While there is little
doubt but that they could be made suable by name by express
enactment, in this case suit against them was not expressly provided for. It was merely implied from the absence of an express
exclusion from liability. A similar implication was made in England
in regard to registered trade unions. The Act of Parliament made
such associations lawful (they had previously been illegal as in
restraint of trade) and gave them the power to hold property and
act through agents. The House of Lords held that from this grant
of capacity to hold property and act through agents could be implied
the liability to the extent of that property for the torts of its agents
the union in its registered name. 8 . In that
in a suit again
case the liability as well as the right to sue by name to enforce it,
had to be implied. In the American case only the right to sue by
name had to be implied as the liability was imposed by the statute.
It can not be questioned that labor unions are "existing under
or authorized by" law. The Clayton Anti-Trust Act excludes from
its prohibitions "labor, agricultural and horticultural organisations,"
and provides that they shall not be held to be illegal combinations
in restraint of trade-14 The federal and state laws providing for
the incorporation of labor unions regard them as existing lawful
organizations before their incorporation. In none of the states are
they regarded as unlawful. They have never been held in this
country to be per se'combinations and conspiracies in restraint of
trade as they were in England previous to the Trade Union Acts of
1871 and I876. The only ground for excluding them from the
scope of the definition in the act is that by it are meant only such
associations as joint stock companies and limited partnerships which
are not corporations- but are given various corporate powers including the right to sue and be sued by name, upon complying with
certain preliminary requirements'provided by statute. But if such
only were meant, "organized under" or some similar phrase would
'Evenson v. Spaulding, i5o Fed. 517 (907).
"Southern Rwy. v. Machinists' Union, iii Fed. 49 (igox).
Vale Co. v. Amalgamated Society, (igoi) A. C. 426 (Eng.).
"Taff
' Act October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 731, c. 323, sec. 6).
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seem more suitable than the broad phrase "existing under." Clearly
any lawful organization is included within the latter phrase.
The demurrers being overruled the case went back to the District Court for trial. It came up on October 23, 1917, and was completed November 22. At the close of the testimony the defendants
moved to dismiss as to the international union on the ground that

the strike was a purely local affair, financed and carried on by the
district and local unions. This motion was dismissed for reasons
which appear later and verdict was returned for the plaintiff for
$2oo,ooo.oo which was automatically trebled and judgment entered
for $6o0,ooo.oo and costs. Since the trial the District Court has
ruled that the Bache-Denman Company may recover interest from
July 17, 1914, making the verdict $240,2oo.oo and the judgment

$720,6oo.o6.
$25,ooo.oo.

The court has also allowed an attorney's fee of

The grounds for denying the motion to dismiss were in substance the following:
The United Mine Workers of America and its constituent parts
are not a federated union similar to the United States, but are
centralized more on the order of France. Every man, every local,
and every district union are members directly of the international
union (international because including unions in Canada and
Mexico). Each local and district union gets its constitution or
charter from the central executive body. This central executive
is the court to interpret the meaning of the provisions of the constitutions. Before final action may be taken on a strike the district
union must send to the national president a statement of "the
grievance complained of, the action contemplated by the district,
together with the reasons therefor, and await the decision of the
national president and be governed thereby: The national union
has the power to discipline the local and district unions, and take
away their charters if they violate its orders. This power is
exercised by the national president and an executive board. Thus
the absolute control of the action of every local and district union
is in the national board.
The policy of the United Mine Workers of America is to unionize as many mines as possible. All the members are aided by a
successful strike in any district. For all non-union mined coal
comes into competition with union mined coal and makes it harder
for the unions to maintain the standards which they have set.
The strike in this case was therefore in accord with the policy of
the national union.
Generally the national union helps the district engaging in a
strike by sending in organizers and paying their expenses. Though
actual participation in this strike by the national organization may
not have been proved, there was evidence that the national officers
knew of the riot of April 6, 1914; that they knew of the continual
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picketing and intimidation between April and July; that they made
no remonstrance against this unlawful violence; that after the concerted attack on July 17, 1914, the national union made no criticism,

disciplined no one-on the other hand strike benefits were paid,
pensions granted, and court costs in connection therewith assumed.
As the national union knew of the use of force prior to July it
was its duty to interfere and prevent further violence, even if
disbarring all the miners involved was necessary. But not only
did it fail to exercise its disciplinary control and prevent further
violence, but actually condoned it, and must therefore be held
responsible for the damage done thereby. The organization can not
approve of acts done in carrying out its policy and accept whatever benefits are thereby attained, and at the same time escape
liability.
In equity, unions and dealers' associations have been held
16
responsible for the illegal acts of their members 5 or branches
or even of non-members when the members were obviously in control of the situation and could have prevented action by outsiders, 17
and have been enjoined from doing or allowing such acts. Merely
instructing the picketers to avoid unlawful methods, if they actually
use such methods and are unpunished, will not be a defense against
an injunction. s Conversely, individual members have been enjoined
which
because of unlawful acts of their officers of fellow-members
20
they did not disavow,19 and in Lawlor v. Loewe, were held liable
in damages for such acts.
The Bache-Denman Case is just the logical extension of the
liability to the large central organization which finances and makes
possible such strikes, and for the ultimate benefit of which they
are carried on.
It has been held by the Supreme Court that section 6 of the
Clayton Act above referred to,21 does not "render lawful or legitimate anything that before the act was unlawful, whether in the
objects of such an organization or its members, or in the means
adopted for accomplishing them." It merely prevents them while
pursuing their legitimate objects by lawful means "from being considered, merely because organized,22 to be illegal combinations or
The Clayton Act will thereconspiracies in restraint of trade."
"Goldfield Co. v. Goldfield Union, 159 Fed. 500 (i9o8). Alaska S. S. Co.
v. Longshoremen's Ass'n, 336 Fed. 964 (igi6).
"Evenson v. Spaulding, see note ii, supra.
'Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, iii Fed. 264 (1901).
'Union Pac. v. Ruef, 12o Fed. io2 (i9o2).
"Ill. Cent. v. Machinists, igo Fed. gio (1gi).
"See note 4, supra.
"See note 14, supra.
'Paine

Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 483 (1917).
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fore not affect this liability to answer in damages for injuries done
by acts in violation of the anti-trust acts.
Entirely aside from the legal aspects of this case it is tremendously significant socially. Heretofore the large labor unions
have been able to receive the benefits from strikes made successful
by unlawful methods, but have escaped all liability for the damage
done. Until Lawlor v. Loewe, 23 the injured persons have been
left to pursue the actual participants if they could discover them.
They were mostly impecunious gentlemen from whom no satisfaction could be obtained. Lawlor v. Loewe, revealed the possibility
of recovering from propertied members of the union. But this
was very unsatisfactory for obvious reasons. Now under this
Bache-Dennan Case the funds of the union itself are liable when
the unlawful acts constitute a violation of the Anti-Trust Laws.
Almost any strike of any size during which unlawful acts are
committed would violate the Anti-Trust Laws. Of course a howl
of protest has gone up from the labor unions. Dues of the miners
in Pennsylvania have risen from fifty cents to seventy-five cents a
month. But they have no real ground for complaint. They have
lost no rights which they had before; unless the ability to unlawfully destroy property without liability may be called a right. Such
acts were unlawful before. They could be enjoined from doing them
and often were. This decision merely places the liability where
rests the power to do or prevent great harm, if not the actual responsibility. Let us hope that with the added liability will come an
added sense of responsibility, and a change of methods. For it is
time that our labor leaders were realizing that violence does their
cause more harm than good, and that the energy used in strikes
might attain much greater permanent results if directed into other
channels.
It is also very probable that the anti-injunction legislation
which the labor leaders desire will be more easily obtained if
damages may be recovered from the unions. One of the chief
reasons for the injunctions has been that after the damage is done
the injured party has had no adequate redress. If he may recover
damages from the union there will not be the same necessity for
injunctions, which are after all no great satisfaction to those injured
by infractions of them. Though the infringers may be sent to
jail the party injured is seldom able to recover any damages from
them as they are usually without property.
E.N.V.
See note 4, supra.

